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Courtesy of Thierno Baldé.

Alumni profile

Thierno Baldé.

Thierno Baldé recalls a peaceful childhood with his
four brothers and three sisters in the small village of Fatako,
Guinea. Born in 1973 to the village chief and his wife, as
a young child, Baldé did not understand the struggles his
country was facing. At that time, Ahmed Sékou Touré, the
first Guinean president after the country gained independence
from France in 1958, was in power. Under Sékou Touré’s
revolutionary socialist regime, political protestors often faced
torture, imprisonment, or execution. The government even
sent Baldé’s uncle, a businessman, to jail three times at Camp
Boiro, the infamous political prison and torture block that
Touré created to silence opposition.

atrocities that I saw changed my life. I guess I lost my innocent
childhood that day.” Baldé resolved to “do my best to make
sure that those things don’t happen again . . . . [T]hat dream
never left me.” By that point, more than 50,000 people had
died at Camp Boiro since its opening in 1958; their “crimes”
included staging student protests.
Baldé continued school in Conakry until he graduated
from high school. After working for one year, he moved to
Switzerland with only U.S. $300 to his name, and earned his
J.D. from the University of Lausanne in 1999. He then earned
an LL.M. in European Union Law and International Economic
Law from the University of Geneva in 2000.

Baldé attended school in Fatako until age eleven, when he
moved to the capital, Conakry, to live with his brother. After
Touré’s death two years later, Baldé entered a French school.
Soon thereafter, the Military Committee of National Recovery
(CMRN) seized power, and its leader, Colonel Lansana Conté,
became the president of Guinea. The CMRN abolished the
Constitution and the National Assembly, and unilaterally led
the country through ordinances, decrees, and decisions by the
president and his ministers.

Then, Baldé moved to Washington, D.C. and began his
studies at WCL, where he received an LL.M in International
Business Law in 2001. Baldé says attending WCL was a
“dream come true.” “My classmates were wonderful,” he
states. “It was one of the most diverse groups in term[s] of
background, nationalities, and experience. I learned a lot, not
only from my classes but also from [the other students].” In
addition, Baldé forged lasting friendships with many of his
professors; he watched his first baseball game with Professor
Michael Diamond and assisted Professor Jamin Raskin during
his campaign for the Maryland State Senate.

After Baldé visited Camp Boiro in 1984, he immediately
knew he wanted to attend law school. “The scenes of the
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Baldé then worked with the World Bank Group for two
years and returned to WCL to receive his third LL.M. in Law
and Government in 2003. During this year, Baldé coached
the René Cassin European Human Rights Moot Court team
and traveled with three students to Strasbourg, France, to
compete in the moot court competition based on the European
Convention on Human Rights. Baldé had also been a member
of the moot court team during law school in Lausanne, and
he encourages all law students, particularly those interested
in litigation, to participate in the “rewarding experience” of
moot court.

presidential election in January 2010, tens of thousands of
people gathered at a Conakry stadium to peacefully protest
the continued military rule and Camara’s apparent candidacy
in the upcoming election. In response, government troops
shot and killed at least 150 people, raped or sexually abused
more than 100 women, and beat numerous other protestors.
Baldé himself was arrested and jailed for helping to organize
a hunger strike. Baldé and others are now focused on “lobbying for the International Criminal Court to investigate and
judge the ones who are responsible [for] the killings.” As of
mid-February, the ICC has begun a preliminary investigation regarding these “crimes against humanity.” Although
President Camara’s government offered Baldé cabinet positions, he twice declined.

In 2006, Baldé completed a J.S.M. in International Legal
Studies with a focus on policy analysis at Stanford Law
School, where he received the Stanford African Student
Association Award and was a staff member on what is now the
Stanford Journal of International Law.

The international community has denounced the abuses
by President Camara’s government and taken steps to isolate
the government and push for accountability for the violence.
In December 2009, one of Camara’s own guards attempted
to assassinate him. Camara flew to Morocco for treatment,
where he has remained in exile. On January 18, 2010, the
military leaders, with the opposition’s assent, appointed civilian Jean-Marie Doré as Prime Minister.

Baldé then returned to Conakry and, in January 2007,
founded the Research Institute on Democracy and Rule of
Law (IRDED), an independent non-profit organization that
promotes democratic principles, free society, and rule of
law in West Africa. Among its projects, IRDED has organized seminars on the Legal Protection of the Media, provided legal counsel to NGOs regarding compliance with the
Ministry of Interior’s licensing requirements, and encouraged
young adults to participate in the electoral process and learn
about nonviolent opposition methods. Baldé is currently the
President of the Board of Directors of IRDED.

Baldé thinks Doré “has an opportunity to organize free
and fair elections and leave a lasting legacy to Guinea . . . .
I hope that he will avoid making the same mistakes as his
predecessors: appointing his close friends and relatives to key
positions and thinking that he will be able to have free hands.”
Baldé strongly believes that “from now on, it will be difficult
for any leader to forgo the will of the people and expect to
remain in power. It’s a daily battle . . . but I have a good feeling.” Guinea’s electoral commission has scheduled the civilian
presidential election for June 27, 2010.

Baldé also “initiated several civic movements with youth
leaders to ask President Conté to step down and establish
a transitional council to organize free and fair elections.”
However, President Conté died in December 2008, and a
group of military officers called the National Council for
Democracy and Development (CNDD) staged a coup only
hours later. The self-proclaimed president, Captain Moussa
Dadis Camara, suspended the constitution and promised to
hold elections in 2009 to establish a civilian-led government,
but those elections were never held. Baldé says, “It was
unthinkable to imagine President Conté’s regime to perpetuate after 24 years of struggle and misery . . . . I believed that
for once we [would] change the destiny of our country for
good.” Baldé and other activists spent many sleepless nights
working to propose reforms for the new government. Of his
discussions with President Camara, Baldé says, “He made me
believe that he wanted to set up the path for the establishment
of democracy and rule of law in Guinea. [A] few months later,
I realized that the commitments made were worthless.”

Baldé was recently appointed the Program Coordinator of
the West Africa Public Interest Litigation Center (WAPILC),
an organization based in Abuja, Nigeria that promotes human
rights by improving the rule of law and access to justice for
West African citizens. Baldé says this position will allow him
“to advocate and lobby for respect of human rights principles
and litigate [human rights] violations within [the Economic
Community of West African States] member countries.”
Baldé is currently studying the legal protection of the
media in Guinea for his S.J.D. dissertation from WCL under
the supervision of Professor Jamin Raskin. He has already
given his first presentation and hopes to return to WCL later
this year to give his final presentation. Baldé remarks, “This
year has been one of the most challenging I have had in a long
time, but I guess these challenges are the forces that make us
want to see the next year, hoping for better things.”
HRB

Throughout the year, the CNDD suppressed political opposition and banned political and union activity. Baldé mounted
a media campaign with private radio stations that denounced
human rights violations and explained the necessity of free
and fair elections. Baldé says most people were not willing to
say these things on air “for fear of being arrested.” Finally, on
September 28, 2009, a month after Camara promised a “fair”

Courtney Moran, a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law, wrote the Alumni Profile for this issue of the Human
Rights Brief.
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Endnotes: Economic Development at the Cost of Human Rights: China Nonferrous Metal Industry
in Zambia continued from page 7
38

65

Mushinge, supra note 3.
Id.
40 “According to Albert Mando, General Secretary of the National
Union of Mining and Allied Workers (NUMAW), workers at the
NFC Africa copper mine, a Chinese-owned operation in Chambishi,
north-eastern Zambia, were shot and wounded by both the police
and Chinese management during a strike in July.” International
Trade Union Confederation, 2007 Annual Survey of Violations
of Trade Union Rights: Zambia, available at http://survey07.ituccsi.org/getcountry.php?IDCountry=ZMB&IDLang=EN [hereinafter
Annual Survey 2007].
41 Kachingwe, supra note 37.
42 Chinese beaten up, supra note 33.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Chinese beaten up, supra note 33.
46 Id.
47 See previous section, “Zambia’s Human Rights Obligations.”
48 Robyn Dixon, Africans Lash out at Chinese Employers, The Los
Angeles Times, Oct. 6, 2006, available at http://articles.latimes.
com/2006/oct/06/world/fg-chizambia6 [hereinafter Dixon].
49 Id.; Guerin, supra note 7.
50 Bench Marks Foundation, Home Page, http://www.bench-marks.
org.za (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
51 Freek Cronjé, Charity Chenga & Johann van Wyk, Corporate
Social Responsibility in the Zambian Mining Industry (Bench
Marks Foundation 2008), available at http://www.bench-marks.
org.za/research/gap3_part1.pdf [hereinafter Corporate Social
Responsibility].
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 51.
55 Id.
56 SomaliPress.com, Controversial Chinese Firm Given Another
Copper Mine in Zambia, http://www.somalipress.com/news/2009jun-02/controversial-chinese-firm-given-another-copper-minezambia.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
57 Id.
58 Current President Lupiya Banda stated the following about NFC:
“I want to assure you that this investor knows and understands the
business of mining.” Id.
59 Dixon, supra note 48.
60 Mushinge, supra note 3.
61 Id.
62 Guerin, supra note 7.
63 Ching Kwan Lee, Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African
Workers and the Politics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese
Enclaves (IRLE Working Papers, No. WP-2009-14, Feb. 2009),
available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2037d9f7
[hereinafter Lee].
64 Id.

African Development Fund, Second Poverty Reduction Budget
Support for Zambia: Appraisal Report (Sept. 2008), available at
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Projectand-Operations/ZM-2008-104-EN-ADF-BD-WP-ZAMBIA-ARSECOND-POVERTY-REDUCTION-BUGET-SUPPORT-PRBS-II.
PDF.
66 Elias Chipimo, Taxing the mining sector, IFLR 1000, http://www.
iflr1000.com/LegislationGuide/150/Taxing-the-mining-sector.html
(last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
67 Id.
68 Danstan Kaunda, Sharing the Copper Windfall, Inter Press
Service News Agency, Aug. 18, 2008, available at http://ipsnews.
net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=43604 [hereinafter Kaunda].
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Kaunda, supra note 68.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Shacinda, supra note 34.
75 Id.
76 Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective, supra
note 11.
77 Annual Survey 2007, supra note 40.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective, supra
note 11; Lee, supra note 63.
81 Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective, supra
note 11.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective, supra
note 11.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective, supra
note 11.
88 Chris Pestraukis, Vulnerability and the Employee: How to
restore dignity to employment in Zambia? (Jesuit Centre for
Theological Reflection 2005), available at: http://www.jctr.org.zm/
downloads/4thQ-05-brief.pdf.
89 Id.
90 Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective, supra
note 11.
91 UDHR, supra note 23.
92 African Charter, supra note 26.
93 Zambia acceded to the ICESCR and the ICCPR on April 10,
1984 and ratified the African Charter on October 21, 1986. United
Nations Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/ (last visited Feb. 8,
2010).
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Endnotes:	The Clash of Human Rights and BIT Investor Claims: Chevron’s Abusive Litigation in
Ecuador’s Amazon continued from page 15
9

stances affecting the environment; specify the technical work and
measures which must be implemented to restore the environmental
damage, as far as technically possible; and determine methods for
restoration based on the characteristics of each environment.
12 See Richard Cabrera Stalin Vega, Technical Summary Report,
Expert Opinion 19 (Mar. 24, 2008), available at http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/cabrera-english-2008.pdf.
13 “Produced water” is toxic water, high in sodium chloride which
comes out of the ground mixed with the crude oil. Because the
water has been in contact with hydrocarbon-bearing formations, it
contains some of the chemical characteristics of the formations and
the hydrocarbons as well as chemicals added during the production processes. Corrie Clark & John A. Veil, Argonne Nation
Lab., Produced Water Volumes and Management Practices in the
United States (2009) (prepared for U.S. Department of Energy,
Office of Fossil Energy, National Energy Technology Laboratory).
“Produced water” can be extremely harmful to animal and plant life
with which it comes into contact. Chevron’s operation in Ecuador
was no exception. For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has a standard of 230 ppm chloride (which measures saltiness) for the protection of freshwater aquatic life. U.S.
EPA. Office of Water Regulations and Standards, Criteria
and Standards Division Ambient Water Quality Criteria for
Chloride–1988 (February 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/
waterscience/criteria/library/ambientwqc/chloride1988.pdf. In an
environmental audit conducted for Texaco as it was winding down
its operation in Ecuador, chloride concentrations measured in every
sample taken from the production water discharged at all eighteen Texaco production stations exceed the EPA standard, several
by an order of magnitude. Most of the samples taken exceeded
10,000 ppm chloride, and the maximum was 104,000 ppm chloride
(seawater has approximately 19,000 ppm chloride). HBT AGRA
Limited, Environmental Assessment of the PetroEcuador-Texaco
Consortium Oil Fields: Volume I – Environmental Audit Report
(1993). These extremely high salt concentrations were toxic to
the organisms in the freshwater streams and rivers downstream
of Texaco’s discharge points. See Vega, supra note 12, at Annex
J. They also, obviously, were harmful to the local inhabitants who
had relied for millennia on those fresh water sources for their sustenance.
14 HBT AGRA Limited, Environmental Assessment of the
PetroEcuador-Texaco Consortium Oil Fields: Volume I –
Environmental Audit Report, 5-10 (1993) (revealing, “No testing is conducted on the wastewater prior to disposal into the
river . . .”) (draft on file with the author); Fugro-McClelland
West, Environmental Field Audit for Practices 1964-1990,
PetroEcuador-Texaco Consortium, Oriente, Ecuador, E-2,
Executive Summary (1992) (stating, “All produced water from
the production facilities eventually discharged to creeks and
streams . . . . None of the discharges were registered with the
Ecuadorian Institute of Sanitary Works (IEOS) as required by
the Regulations for the Prevention and Control of Environmental
Pollution related to Water Resources (1989)”) (on file with author).
15 The release by its plain language and legislative history never
intended to cover claims by third parties of the type being pressed
in Aguinda. The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the

For documents related to the sting operation, see Chevron Toxico,
Chevron’s Corruption of Ecuador Trial, http://chevrontoxico.com/
news-and-multimedia/chevrons-corruption.html (last visited Feb.
22, 2010). A Chevron contractor and Ecuadorian citizen, Diego
Borja, along with an American man passing himself off as the
owner of an environmental remediation company, induced the thentrial judge Juan Nuñez to meet with them to discuss the status of
the trial. During this meeting, both men secretly videotaped the
judge via micro-cameras in a pen and a watch to later claim the
judge had already decided to rule against Chevron. The videos,
however, do not support Chevron’s account and the judge is never
seen on camera indicating he would rule one way or another. It
turned out that Borja has worked for Chevron for several years
on the Aguinda trial and was relocated to the United States and
provided with a criminal lawyer paid for by Chevron, preventing
him from being questioned. Borja also receives a salary from
the company while he lives in the United States. The American
involved in the scheme, Wayne Hansen, turned out to have lied
about his credentials as the owner of a remediation company and
had been convicted for his involvement in a conspiracy to import
275,000 pounds of marijuana to the United States from Colombia.
See id. for PDF of investigative report on the sting operation.
10 See Richard Cabrera, Responses the Plaintiffs Questions
Concerning the Expert Report (Nov. 2008) (Updated Report), p.34
Response to Question 42 (estimating the number of excessive cancer deaths attributable to contamination exposure at 1,401); see
also Miguel San Sebastián et al., Outcomes of Pregnancy among
Women Living in the Proximity of Oil Fields in the Amazon Basin
of Ecuador, 8 No. 4 Int’l J. of Occupational & Envtl. Health
312 (2002) (finding pregnancies of women in communities relying on streams with high TPH concentrations significantly more
likely to end in spontaneous abortion); Miguel San Sebastián et al.,
Exposures and Cancer Incidence Near Oil Fields in the Amazon
Basin of Ecuador, 58 No. 8 Occupational & Envtl. Med. 517
(2001) (revealing severe exposure to TPHs by the residents of the
community of San Carlos and significantly higher than expected
rates of cancer and cancer deaths, even when controlling for
employment in the oil industry and smoking habits); Miguel San
Sebastián et al., La salud de mujeres que viven cerca de pozos
y estaciones de petróleo en la Amazonía ecuatoriana, 9 No. 6
Revista Panamericana de Salud Publica 375 (2001) (demonstrating significantly higher prevalence of skin fungi, nasal irritation,
and throat irritation, and associations with higher prevalence of
fatigue, headaches, eye irritation, earaches, diarrhea, and gastritis in women living in communities relying on streams with high
TPH concentrations); Anna-Karen Hurtig & Miguel San Sebastián,
Incidence of Childhood Leukemia and Oil Exploitation in the
Amazon Basin of Ecuador, 10 No. 3 Int’l J. of Occupational &
Envtl. Health 245 (2004) (finding significantly higher rates of
child leukemia in Oriente counties where oil exploitation had been
ongoing for at least twenty years as compared with non-oil-producing counties).
11 The President of the Court in Nueva Loja appointed a Court
Expert to evaluate the environmental damage suffered, if any, to
the soil, water, vegetation, fauna in the surrounding area to specify,
if possible, the origin of such damage; verify the existence of sub-
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guanta-inspection.html?searched=guanta&advsearch=allwords&hig
hlight=ajaxSearch_highlight+ajaxSearch_highlight1.
25 Petitioner’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Republic
of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. No. 09
Civ. 9958 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 10, 2010) (citing Letter from M.
Kolis (Aug. 11, 2005), which stated, “Texaco and now Chevron’s
representatives have met regularly with representatives of the
Republic to discuss various matters between the company and
the Republic. As new administrations have come to power in
Ecuador . . . Texaco and Chevron representatives have always
made efforts to meet with government officials, including the
President, if possible . . . to discuss the state of affairs between
the company and the Republic.”).
26 For a letter from the International Commission of Jurists and
Amnesty International, see Press Release, International Commission
of Jurists (June 14, 2006), available at http://www.texacotoxico.org/
eng/node/41.
27 Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 499 F. Supp. 2d
452 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
28 Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp.. 296 F. App’x 124,
2008 WL 4507422 (2d Cir. Oct. 7, 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2862 (2009).
29 In an Arbitration under the Treaty Between the U.S. and
the Republic of Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment and the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, (UNCITRAL PCA Case No. AA277).
30 Issued by the First Civil Court of Pichincha, Case No. 2003-0983
(Feb. 26, 2007).
31 See Douglas Beltman, Equitable Justice: A Comparison of
Environmental Disasters and Cleanup Costs, Stratus Consulting
(May 20, 2008) (finding the actual damages in the Cabrera report is
consistent with damages assessments for other large environmental
disasters) (noting Hanford nuclear waste facility, United States, U.S.
$53 to $63 billion; Prestige oil spill, Spain, U.S. $4.2 billion; and
Rocky Flats, United States, U.S. $7.2 billion) (on file with author).
32 Ben Casselman, Chevron Expects to Fight Ecuador Lawsuit in
U.S., Wall St. J., July 20, 2009, at B3.
33 Press Release, Chevron, Chevron Calls for Dismissal of Ecuador
Lawsuit (Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.chevron.com/news/
press/Release/?id=2007-10-08.
34 Michael Isikoff, A $16 Billion Problem, Newsweek, Jul. 26, 2008,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/149090.
35 Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration, Chevron Corp. & Texaco
Petroleum Co. v. Republic of Ecuador (Perm. Ct. Arb. Sept. 23,
2009), available at http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/
EcuadorBITEn.pdf.
36 Though Chevron argues it is not liable in the Aguinda trial
because of a prior U.S. $40 million remediation agreement with the
Ecuadorian government, the S.D.N.Y. was extensively briefed on
the issue in prior and pending arbitration cases between Republic of
Ecuador and Chevron and has indicated it is “highly unlikely” the
release applied to the plaintiffs’ claims. See Republic of Ecuador v.
Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co., No. 09 Civ. 9958, FN 20
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 10, 2010) (explaining (1) the “release” on its
face was limited to claims by the Republic and PetroEcuador; (2)
the parties had expressly agreed in Article VIII of a 1994 MOU that
the Republic’s and PetroEcuador’s release of TexPet would “apply
without prejudice to the rights possibly held by third parties for the
impact caused as a consequence of the operations of the former

parties provided that “[t]he provisions of this [MOU] shall apply
without prejudice to the rights possibly held by third parties for the
impact caused as a consequence of the operations of the former
Petroecuador-Texaco consortium.” Memorandum of Understanding
Between the Government of Ecuador, Petroecuador, and Texaco
Petroleum Company (Dec. 14, 1994) (on file with author). A 1995
settlement agreement that followed the MOU by its terms released
only those claims belonging to Ecuador and Petroecuador. The 1995
Settlement Agreement states in pertinent part: “On the execution
date of this contract . . . the Government and Petroecuador shall
hereby release, acquit, and forever discharge Texpet . . . Texaco,
Inc. . . . of all the Government’s and Petroecuador’s claims against
the Releases for Environmental Impact arising from the Operations
of the Consortium, except for those related to the obligations
conducted hereunder for the performance by Texpet of the Scope
of Work.” Contract for Implementing of Environmental Remedial
Work and Release from Obligations, Liability and Claims (May 4,
1995) (on file with author).
16 Vega, supra note 12, at 26 (finding that “the level of petroleum
contamination in pits that were cleaned up by Texpet appears to be
no lower than the contamination in pits that Texpet did not clean
up”).
17 See Doug Beltman & Ann Maest, Texaco’s Misuse of the TCLP
Test in Ecuador (Feb. 2009), available at http://chevrontoxico.com/
assets/docs/tclp-misuse.pdf; see also Amazon Defense Coalition,
New Evidence Shows Chevron Manipulated Lab Results in
Landmark Environmental Trial (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://
chevrontoxico.com/news-and-multimedia/2009/0204-new-evidenceshows-chevron-manipulated-lab-results.html?searched=TCLP&a
dvsearch=allwords&highlight=ajaxSearch_highlight+ajaxSearch_
highlight1.
18 Jorge Roberto Salcedo Gonzalez, Inspección Judicial del Pozo
Shushufindi 38, Prepared for Chevron Re: Maria Aguinda y Otros
vx. ChevronTexaco Coporation, Corte Superior de Justicia, Nuevo
Loja, Ecuador, Jucio No. 002-2003 (Mar. 16, 2006).
19 Press Release, Congresswoman Linda Sanchez, Members of
Congress Urge USTR to Ignore Chevron Petition on Ecuador Legal
Case (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.lindasanchez.house.
gov/news.cfm/article/595 (stating, “Rather than allowing this case
to come to a conclusion, embarking on clean-up efforts, or even
seeking mediation, Chevron has engaged in a lobbying effort that
looks like little more than extortion . . . . Apparently, if it can’t get
the outcome it wants from the Ecuadorian court system, Chevron
will use the U.S. government to deny trade benefits until Ecuador
‘cries uncle.’”).
20 See supra note 6.
21 Id.
22 See Carl Pope, Pity the Poor Oil Company, Sierra Club, Apr.
25, 2008, http://sierraclub.typepad.com/carlpope/2008/04/pity-thepoor-o.html.
23 See Fund For Peace, Health and Business Roundtable Indonesia,
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_conten
t&task=view&id=320&Itemid=483 [(last visited Feb. 16, 2010)]
(noting, “Chevron…[was] the first member to provide financial
support to sustain HBRI by sponsoring the sixth Roundtable session
and third workshop) .
24 For copy of military report, see Military Report on Cancellation
of Guanata Inspection, available at http://chevrontoxico.com/newsand-multimedia/2005/1020-military-report-on-cancellation-of-
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PETROECUADOR-ECUADOR Consortium;” (3) TexPet’s principal
Ecuadorian legal advisor at the time the MOU and Settlement
Agreement were executed testified that Article VIII of the MOU
“carves out entirely” from the release “any action brought by parties
who were not parties to the settlement agreement”; (4) in any
event, and as a matter of Ecuadorian law, the Republic could not
waive the rights of third parties; and (5) even though the Aguinda
case in which the plaintiffs sought equitable relief in the form of
remediation of the “contamination and spoliation of [plaintiffs’]
properties, water supplies and environment” had been pending for
two years by the time the 1995 Settlement Agreement was signed,
the Agreement and its release made no reference to the pending
Aguinda case whatsoever and included neither an indemnification
nor a save harmless clause with respect to third-party claims. As
S.D.N.Y. observed in its 2005 decision in Republic of Ecuador v.
ChevronTexaco Corp., “Absent this contention by Defendants [that
the claims brought in Lago Agrio were different than the claims
in Aguinda], it would be extremely difficult for Defendants to
establish that claims nominally brought by third parties in the Lago
Agrio litigation were covered by the 1995 and 1998 Agreements
between Texaco and Ecuador: it is highly unlikely that a settlement
entered into while Aguinda was pending would have neglected to
mention the third-party claims being contemporaneously made
in Aguinda if it had been intended to release those claims or to
create an obligation to indemnify against them.” (citing Republic
of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334, 374
(S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
37 Although there have been efforts to reform ICSID tribunals
to allow amicus curiae, these efforts have not yet extended to
UNCITRAL proceedings. See Brigette Stern, Civil Society’s Voice
in the Settlement of International Economic Disputes, 22 No. 2
FOREIGN INV. L. J. 280 (2007). However, even if plaintiffs were
able to intervene as amicus curiae under UNCITRAL rules, the
rights of the plaintiffs will not be adequately protected. First, as
a non-disputing party, those whose rights are at the center of the
dispute would not be “parties” to the arbitration. The tribunal, in
private, has discretion to refuse the request or limit the level of
involvement. Even where plaintiffs can show significant interest
in the proceeding and relevant factual and legal insight, the
tribunal need not grant amicus status nor give the submission
appropriate weight. The tribunal may disregard any argument made
by the amici, especially where a party to the dispute expresses its
opposition, as Chevron surely would. This hardly safeguards the
expectations of the 30,000 plaintiffs who have fought for seventeen
years to hold ChevronTexaco accountable for the destruction of
their homeland. Second, the forum provides no transparency. There
is no publication of the case records without consent from both
parties, no opportunity for plaintiffs to appear as witnesses, and
no access to the arbitral hearings without consent of both parties.
Therefore, those whose rights are most greatly impacted would be
without a voice, without access to information, and without redress
in the event of an adverse decision. Notably, there is no evidence
that third party submissions, even when accepted, have ever
affected a tribunal’s determination. See Eloise Obadia, Extension
of Proceedings Beyond the Original Parties: Non-Disputing Party
Participation in Investment Arbitration, 22 No. 2 Foreign Inv. L. J.
349 (2007).
38 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) (adopted by the General
Assembly on Dec. 15, 1976).

Several U.S. investors in Ecuador have complained confidentially
to the authors that Chevron’s strategy is undermining the investment
climate in the country and impinging on U.S. investment interests
generally. Separately, leaders of the Ecuador-American Chamber
of Commerce in Ecuador have indicated confidentially that they
have been pressured by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (of which
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